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CAN IT REALLYBE UNCONSTITUTIONALTO
REGULATE PRODUCT SAFETY INFORMATION?
David Cohen *

Introduction
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have
confirmed the worst suspicions of many that deliberate constitutional silence on the protection of economic and property interests
would be ineffective in preventing judicial interpretations which
envelop a range of corporate conduct with the legitimacy of constitutional protection. Judicial interpretation of s. 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Ford v. Quebec
(Attorney General)' and in Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney
G e n e r ~ l )has
, ~ extended constitutional protection to "commercial
speech" - corporate expressive conduct intended to further
economic interests by encouraging a market transaction, or
providing information relating to the market transaction. Charter
protection is subject, of course, to the government's opportunity
under s. 1 of the Charter to justlfy the restrictions on corporate
expression which were imposed by governmental action. These
developments raise important questions concerning the constitutionality of much of Canada's information-based product safety
regulatory framework. Judicial protection of commercial speech is
a response to the typical corporate claim that:3
-

Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This paper was
delivered as a contribution to the Symposium on Commercial Free Speech and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms held as part of the programme of the 19th
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law at the Faculty of Law,University
of Toronto, on October 13-14,1989.
(1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [I98812 S.C.R. 712. Canadians thus can boast of the dubious
achievement of reaching, within the first decade of the Charter, the point that Americans
had taken a century to accomplish. See J.W. Memll, "First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Advertising" (1976), 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205. Memll reviews the history of
the commercial free speech doctrine which was unprotected before 1975 under Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Until the mid-1970s, one could say with some
confidence that "the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint[s] on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." Memll, ibid., at p. 207.
(1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [I9891 1 S.C.R. 927.
See E. Bardach and R. Kagan, Going by the Book (Philadelphia, Temple University
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. . . mandatory disclosure for such political purposes can become a
mechanism whereby the government forces sellers to undertake an uncompensated program of public education - or propaganda, depending on
one's viewpoint - thereby turning their packages into mini billboards for
messages designed to persuade rather than to prevent deception.
In this paper, I examine the impact of these decisions on
information-based product safety regulation which, in a variety of
guises in Canada, can be said to restrict manufacturers', distribIn the end,
utors' and marketers' ability to "express" them~elves.~
I conclude that, if one appreciates the justification for and the
processes by which this kind of product safety regulation is instituted, there is only a small risk that the current regulatory activity
will be held unconstitutional. When one takes into account the
degree of co-operation between business and government in
establishing the content of most regulatory activity and the benign
nature of most of Canada's packaging and labelling requirements,
one is led to the almost inescapable conclusion that the Charter
challenges do not pose a serious threat to the existence of these
laws.
Yet that conclusion does not mean that we should completely
disregard the impact of the Charter and the courts on the
regulatory process. Perceived threats of constitutional challenges
are now aspects of the environment in which regulators must
work. There is undoubtedly an increased risk that protecting
commercial speech will discourage' more aggressive regulatory
strategies and the enforcement of existing legislation - areas
where activity is already at a near stand~till.~
The protection of
commercial speech implied by the recent events contributes to the
confusion, contradiction and uncertainty of much of product
safety regulation in Canada.6 Further policy developments will be
Press, 1982), p. 259. This is perhaps what lies behind the striking down of state legislation
restricting advertising by utility companies as a conservation strategy. See Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
4 For the purposes ofathis paper I assume that the proposition that governmental action
which requires a certain kind or content of expression, whether through negative or
positive informational requirements, equally limits a corporation's choice to express
"meaning" with regard to the constituents, performance, operation or other characteristic of the products it sells. See Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 2 , at p. 606.
5 See E. Belobaba, "The Development of Consumer Protection Regulation: 1945 to 1984",
in I. Bemier and S. Lajoie, eds., Consumer Protection, Environmental Law and
Corporate Power, Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development, Prospects
for Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985). See also, J.C. Shaul and M.J.
Trebilcock, "The Administration of the Federal Hazardous Products Act" (1982-83), 7
C.B.L.J. 2.
6 See Belobaba,supra, footnote 5,passim, especially at pp. 46-62.
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even more dependent on and influenced by legal norms - a fact
which has elicited concern in the past.' In the end, however,
notwithstanding the enormous impact of Ford and Irwin Toy on
the political economy of Quebec, regulators concerned with
product safety regulation will largely go about their business the
way they always have.8
1. The Legal Environment

In late 1988, in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),g the
Supreme Court of Canada was confronted with the question of
whether the Charter's "freedom of expression" section should be
extended to protect corporations as well as individuals. In Ford,
the Supreme Court expressly refrained1°from settling the question
of the application of the Charter to consumer protection issues.
Although the decision in Irwin Toy, handed down four months
later, has in large measure diminished the significance of the
earlier cases in regard to commercial free speech, the sentiment of
the court in the earlier appeals remains instructive. In Ford, the
court placed particular emphasis on the ability of the government
to regulate the kind of information available to consumers in the
market-place, and indicated that "judicial regulation of govern7

Ibid., at p. 36.

8 That is, notwithstanding the

assimilationof political debate and advertising represented in
cases like Irwin Toy, I predict that the Charter will thus not significantly redefine the
boundaries of the current regulation of the economy and economic activities by the
federal and provincial governments. See T.H. Jackson and J.C. Jeffries, Jr., "Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment" (1979), 65 Va. L.
Rev. 1. They criticized Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in which the Supreme Court invalidated state legislation restricting pharmaceutical price advertising, as "a contradiction of the heretofore
settled idea that the Constitution tolerates extensive regulation of the economy". Ibid., at
p. 32.
The view that cases like Irwin Toy should not be interpreted as a radical judicial attack
on economic regulation is supported by recent American experience as well. Tracy
Westen, in "The First Amendment: Barrier or Impetus to FTC Advertising Remedies?"
(1980), 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 487, writes that the extension of commercial speech
protection to "issue advertising" in the United States has led some to say that "Virginia
Pharmacy and its progeny have imposed an unprecedented restraint on the FTC to police
unfair and deceptive trade practices." Ibid., at p. 490. She concludes, none the less, that
"the commercial speech cases mandate no 'fundamental change in basic FTC policies".
Ibid.
Supra, footnote 1 .
'OThe court wrote "We are not asked in this case to deal with the distinct issue of the
permissible scope of regulation of advertising (for example, to protect consumers)." See
Ford, ibid., at p. 619.
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mental regulation" in this context was problematical to say the
least. l1
The Zrwin Toy appeal addressed the constitutionality of one of
the most far-reaching information style consumer protection
provisions in Canada -the prohibition of advertising directed at
children in Quebec.12 The case articulated a formal "test" for
determining whether freedom of expression has been breached. If
corporate activity "conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it
has expressive content andprima facie falls within the scope of the
guarantee".13 The definition encompasses and protects virtually
the entire range of human conduct ,I4 and applies equally to both
individuals and corporate bodies. The sheer breadth of the test
suggests that a vast majority of the commercial free speech adjudication will be determined by a s. 1analysis.15
The question of whether "information-based" consumer
product safety regulation is in danger of an industry-led assault
that uses C.J. Dickson's judgment in Irwin Toy as its main
weapon, requires us to understand something about the content
and processes which characterize this regulatory arena. In the next
part of this paper, I briefly review the rationale for information
regulation, its place in the regulatory milieu and how information
policies are developed in the regulatory process.
11 The

court based its decision not to exclude commercial expression from constitutional
protection on the fact that it, "protects listeners as well as speakers [and] plays a
significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, and
important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy". Ibid., footnote
1, at p. 618.
12 Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 9 (R.S.Q., c. P-40.1), ss. 248,249 and 252 and
Regulations respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q. 1981, c.
P-40.1,r. l,ss.87to91.
13 Zrwin Toy,supra, footnote 2, at p. 607.
14 lbid., supra, footnote 2, at pp. 605-9. J. Weinberg, in "Constitutional Protection of
Commercial Speech" (1982), 82 Col. L. Rev. 720, identifies four values promoted by the
First Amendment - political self-government, self-fulfillment through self-expression,
discovery of "truth" and developments through perception. While these do not precisely
track the values articulated by Dickson C.J., his language in Invin Toy indicates that he
and Weinberg believe that the first, third and fourth are furthered by the protection of
commercial speech. See Irwin Toy,ibid., at p. 614.
15 There is a growing body of literature on the development of the court's approach to
governmental attempts to justify its actions under s. 1. Most take the view that the
expansive reading of the substantive freedoms in the Charter has had the effect of
throwing much of the debate into s. 1. See P.A. Chapman, "The Politics of Judging:
Section 1of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1986), 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 867; A.
Petter and P. Monahan, "Developments in Constitutional Law: 1986-87 Term" (1988),
10 S. Ct. L. Rev. 61; and R. Elliott, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 Erosion of the Common Front" (1987), 12 Queen's L.J. 277. All agree that the fluidity
and imprecision of the s. 1analysis largely precludes prediction based on textual analysis.
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The Regulatory Environment
Depending on one's definition of "restrict"l6 there is an
enormous range of regulatory initiatives through which federal
and provincial governments restrict a form of expression in order
to control access by others to its meaning in an attempt to protect
individuals from engaging in transactions without adequate or
with inaccurate information.17 The disclosure of ingredients on
food packages,18 fibre content in percentages on most cloth
garments19 and safety warnings on containers of poisonous
materials20are typical examples of statutorily mandated provision
of information. The federal Hazardous Products Act21 prohibits
the manufacture, sale or advertising of a collection of products
ranging from science sets to carpets to bags of charcoal unless a
warning referring to potential safety risks is prominently displayed
on the label. Other federal statutes22also can be seen as restricting
a form of expression by requiring that certain products must be
sold with specific information, presented in a specific manner.
Provincial legislation, especially in the area of pesticides
regulation23 similarly contributes to the array of informationbased regulatory policies employed in response to product safety
risks. Mandatory disclosure of information is simply the most
pervasive form of product safety regulation in Canada.24
2.

16 AS I

point out below, there may be an argument that government regulations which
require additional information from commercial enterprises do not limit speech. It is
equally logical, however, to treat mandatory disclosure requirements as more offensive
than mere restrictions on speech conduct, in so far as they force individuals to say things
which they do not believe.
l7 This is the test applied in the majority judgment in Invin Toy, to distinguish expression
from non-expressive conduct.
18 See Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27). Food and
Drugs Act Regulations, C.R.C. 1978,c. 870, B.01.008.
19See Textile Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 46 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. T-10).
Textile Labelling and Advertising Regulations, C.R.C. 1978,c. 1551, s. 4.
"See Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9). Pest
Control Product Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1253,ss. 27 to39.
21 R.S.C. 1985,~.
H-3:
22The most significant are the Weights and Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-6; Pest
Control Products Act, supra, footnote 20; and the Food and Drug Act, supra, footnote
18.

see, for example, the Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1980,c. 376.

23
Z4 The

government also prohibits certain foods from being labelled in a certain manner

(e.g., "low-calorie" or "for low-sodium diets") unless they meet standards set by the

federal Food and Drug Act. See Food and Drug Act Regulations, supra, footnote 18.
These regulations set standards which must be met before products can be marketed with
a particular name. This type of regulation is similar in intent to the more obvious prohibition of false, misleading or deceptive packaging, labelling or advertising.
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Information-based consumer protection policies can conveniently be placed at one end of a continuum reflecting the level of
intervention in the market by government. Given the choice of
direct government delivery of goods and services, the nationalization of private industry, taxation policy, subsidies, licensing and
certification requirements, product performance and design
standards, product bans, insurance requirements, it is obvious
that information-based product safety policies are the least
intrusive regulatory instrument available to governments whose
objectives include the provision of "safety".
Even with information-based product safety regulatory policies,
one can identify at least three distinct regulatory instruments
available to governments, which in turn represent different
degrees of government intervention in the market.25Governments
may require corporations to label products with specified information in a specified form to ensure disclosure to consumers;
governments can set performance and design standards that must
be met before the product can be labelled in a certain manner; and
finally, governments can prohibit the dissemination of information, in particular deceptive packaging and labelling,
altogether.26
Information-based product safety regulation of the kind
described above has been the subject of considerable attention in
recent years.27As the study of law and economics continues to
burgeon so too do the plaudits for government regulation that
relies heavily on information p0licies.~8The regulatory objective
See M.A. Utton, The Economics of Regulating Industry (1986), Chapter 4, especially at
p. 38. To the information remedies I have mentioned, we can add the financing of
independent organizations that provide information to consumers which inform them of
product characteristics.
26 Moving from information policies to those that are more intrusive, the government may
employ content standards that have to be met before a product can be introduced into the
market, and may ban products from the market entirely. While these are clearly more
intrusive than information-based regulation, the current treatment of constitutional
liberties has not extended Charter protection to trade. See, infra, at Part 4 where the
implications of this omission are discussed.
27 After occupying a "slum dwelling in the town of economics" for many years, the study of
information economics has grown to the point where one somewhat presumptive theorist
deemed the 1970s the "information economics decade". See M.A. Utton, supra,
footnote 25, at Chapter 4; H. Beales, R. Craswell and S.C. Salop, "The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information" (1981), 24 J. Law & Econ. 491.
28 Those who have argued that information policies are under-utilized include R. Reich,
"Toward a New Consumer Protection" (1979), 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1; M. Pertschuk,
Revolt Against Regulation (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982), p. 149;
Bardach and Kagan, supra, footnote 3, and Utton, supra, footnote 25.
25
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that consumers possess adequate information in market transactions is consistent with an important assumption about information underlying much of modem economic the0rizing.~9And
for many reasons, that assumption will not be realized absent
government intervention.
Markets in information often fail to produce optimal quantities
and quality of information to consumers for reasons which are not
difficult to u n d e r ~ t a n d .First,
~ ~ information related to product
safety and performance is a public good, and because the producer
cannot always appropriate the entire gains from its utilization, it
will often be under-produced. Second, the marginal costs to the
producer of disseminating the information will almost by
definition exceed the value to it of disclosing negative product
safety information, and again the information will be underproduced. Third, information may be under-produced where
consumers cannot efficiently police the accuracy and completeness
of the information at point of ~ a l e . Fourth,
~l
using the litigation
system to .internalize these costs will rarely correct the underproduction given the disincentive to litigate, limits on recovery of
certain kinds of losses, and the status of the distributor as a repeat
player.
The resulting market failure, due to consumers' deficient information and information processing capabilities, provides the
strongest rationale for most information policies. They provide an
information solution to an information problem. The fact that
information policies - especially mandatory disclosure maintain the myth of consumer sovereignty and for the most part
avoid the paternalistic implication^^^ of standard setting and
product bans accounts for much of the current popularity of information policies. More important, information-based remedies
permit producers to make relatively unconstrained choices about
-

-

29 See Belobaba, supra, footnote 5, at p. 43.
30 These points are developed in some detail in Beales, Craswell and Salop, supra,

footnote
27.
31 Thus market failure may be most likely where the true wsts and risks of a product are not
obvious to the consumer at the time of purchase, conditions which are increasingly
prevalent in a market-place replete with complex goods.
32 See Reich, supra, footnote 28. He emphasises the non-paternalistic basis of this
conception of replation. For an article that confronts and attempts to rebunk this
aversion to explicit paternalistic motives, see D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power" (1982), 41 Md L. Rev. 563.

Heinonline - - 17 Can. Bus. L.J. 6 1 1990-1991

62 Canadian Business Law Journal

Wol. 17

product characteristics, retaining the dynamism of the market in
responding to changes in consumer preferences and technology.
Finally, information-based product safety regulation permits a
range of products accommodating a wide range of consumer
preferences towards mixes of price, product quality and safety,
rather than imposing a single choice on all consumers.
The transformation of this model of informational failure into
practice through the development of information-based product
safety regulation has been left in Canada to departmental bureaucrats at both the provincial and federal levels of government. An
analysis of a typical regulatory institution reveals several
important insights into how the economic theory justifying
information-based product safety regulation is transformed in the
regulatory process. It is that process which will determine the
likely impact of cases like Irwin Toy on information-based
regulatory policies which restrict commercial speech.
A typical regulatory apparatus which may serve this purpose is
the current federal administration of the Hazardous Products Act
- a department to which considerable research has been
directed.33The Product Safety Branch administers the Act under
supervision by the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.
The Act is administered as criminal legislation, containing
maximum penalties of up to two years in prison or six months and
a $1,000 fine. The administrative process has been described as
"internally open''34and non-adversarial, where the major industry
actors are involved intensively in the regulatory process, and
where the system is considerably less open to other potentially
When a product is identified as being potentially
affected partie~.~S
hazardous, an advisory committee is convened consisting of
33 See R. Hirshhorn,

"The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", in D.Dewees,
ed., The Regulation of Quality (Toronto, Butterworths, 1983), Chapter 7; Shaul and
Trebilcock, supra, footnote 5; R. Hirshhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the
Hazardous Product Act, Tech. Rep. No. 10, Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa,
Economic Council of Canada, 1981).
34 See Hirshhorn, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", ibid., at p. 177.
35 Ibid. at p. 178. The literature advancing the theory that industry has to some extent
"captured" the regulators is considerable. For an empirical study of the American scene
see P. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton, N . J . ,
Princeton University Press, 1981). One description of the Canadian experience is
contained in R.G. Shapiro and D.R. Hughes, An Analysis of the Effects of Government
Regulations on the Canadian Fruit and Vegetable Processing Industry, Working Paper
No. 11, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation Reference (Ottawa, Economic
Council of Canada, 1980),at p. 67.
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members of the affected industry, standards organizations,
importers and other government agencies.36That advisory panel
co-operates with members of the Product Safety Branch in
designing the regulatory response, if any, to the alleged safety
risk. The relative weakness of organized consumer advocacy
groups in Canada increases the relative influence of the regulated
industries in this regulatory process, which combines with the
structure of the regulatory process to produce what has been
described as a "somewhat lax" enforcement
Aggressive
regulatory action has also been hindered by budgetary restraints
and the absence of a reliable source of information on productcaused injuries .38
While industry enjoys considerable influence in the regulatory
process, it has nothing to gain by revealing this to the public. Thus,
despite this congenial atmosphere, regulatory intervention is often
portrayed by industry as being too heavy-handed.39 A recent
assessment of federal consumer protection regulation concludes
"on paper at least, Canadian consumer protection legislation can
almost compete with such pro-consumer jurisdictions as Sweden
and Japan" .40
This regulatory structure is coupled with process characteristics
which are extremely relevant to an assessment of the constitutional validity of information-based regulation. For more than a
decade the federal government has required relatively sophisticated socio-economic impact analyses ("SEIA) to accompany
each new proposed regulatory change in the "Health, Safety and
Fairness" areas under federal juri~diction.~~
In order to provide
36 Hirshhom, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act", ibid., at p. 177.
37 See Shaul and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 5;and Hirshhom, Product Safety Regulation

and the Hazardous Products Act, supra, footnote 33, at p. 111.
R. Hirshhom, writing in 1980,reports that the number of staff has remained the same
since the early years of the programme and suggests that the fact that Canada spends 5%
of what the United States spends in this field is a disproportionately low amount. The
need for a system that provides regulators with reliable information from medical practitioners on the cause of injuries is emphasized by both by Hirshhom, ibid. at pp. 114,115,
and by Belobaba, supra, footnote 5 at p. 74.
39 The setting of strict standards for hockey helmets, and the initial product ban (subsequently revoked) on 1.5Lglass carbonated beverage containers have both been attacked
as being inefficient. Hirshhom, "The Administration of the Hazardous Products Act",
supra, footnote 33, at pp. 193-4and 184-5.
Belobaba, supra, footnote 5,at p. 69,emphasis added.
41 Socioeconomic Impact Analysis, Chapter 490,Administrative Policy Manual, Treasury
Board of Canada (December, 1979).
38
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guidance to regulators and coherent rationales for regulatory
intervention to the public, the federal government requires all new
non-emergency regulatory amendments and additions to be
subjected to an analysis which attempts to assess the social costs
and benefits that would result from proposed regulatory action.
While most would concede42 that such cost-benefit analysis
represents a useful analytical tool in complex regulatory decisionmaking, it is equally clear that there are dangers in employing it
uncritically. The measurement of the value of differing levels of
inflation, the impact of regulatory intervention on market structures, the international trade implications of proposed regulatory
action, and the valuation of human life and pain and suffering are
at best inexact, and at worst simply a conceptual charade. The
failure to develop a reliable source of information describing
product-related deaths and injuries and the problems of uncertain
scientific data43 lessen the supposed rationality of the socioeconomic impact analyses. In addition to the problem of uncertainty, Belobaba has described the particularly narrow perspective
which characterizes the economic approach to regulation and the
associated implication that the "right" answer is actually there to
be found, as a major impediment to better consumer protection
law in Canada.44The danger is that regulators searching for some
solidity in the shifting sand will come to rely too heavily on what
can often be only marginally useful economic analyses. Tuohy
fears that the impact analysis will be used in large measure as a
stalling tactic when more immediate action is required.45 The
technicality of the analysis means that many unorganized and
under-funded groups will be effectively marginalized from the
regulatory process.
Nonetheless, the economic model which justifies informationbased regulatory intervention, together with the administrative
structures and analytical processes involved in regulatory intervention in this area, provide the government with a powerful
For two vocal opponents of the use of cost-benefitand cost-effectivenessanalyses, see M.
Kelman, "Cost-Benefit Analysis- An Ethical Critique" (1981), 5 Regulation 33; and D.
Kennedy, "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique" (1983), 33 Stan.
L. Rev. 387.
43 See C. Tuohy, "Regulation and Scientific Complexity: Decision Rules and Processes in
the Occupational Health Arena" (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 562.
Belobaba,supra, footnote 5, at p. 54.
45 Tuohy, supra, footnote 43, at p. 575.

42

*
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weapon with which to demonstrate to the judiciary that its
regulatory intervention was justified. Moreover, given the
relatively non-intrusive character of most information-based
product safety regulation, the courts are unlikely to be aggressive
participants in a close technical re-evaluation of the social costbenefit analysis on which the information-based product safety
regulation is supposedly based. Not only is the analysis complex,
the data uncertain and the valuations imprecise, but, as one
commentator has put it, "One can find . . . some spill-over cost
rationale for regulating almost anything."46

3. Does Protecting Commercial Speech Matter?
The Supreme Court decision to assimilate political debate to
advertising and thus the creation of a guarantee of freedom of
commercial expression in the Charter has generated serious
doubts about the constitutionality of much of the information
policies currently employed in Canada. The equal footing that
corporate entities and individuals are given in Dickson C.J.C.3
judgment in Irwin Toy, and the fact that two of the five sitting
judges47 did not see Quebec's violation of s. 2(b)as justified under
s. 1, would seem to support that concern. As Bob Sharpe
predicted, however, a more careful analysis of the landscape
should dispel much of that fear.48 That is, the characteristic
structure of most of our federal and provincial information
policies, the extent to which they are enforced, the role the
regulated enjoy in formulating policy, and a consideration of
recent Charter adjudication all suggest that radical fears of the
Charter being used to strike at these provisions are almost totally
unju~tified.~g
The reasons why the Supreme Court's posture does
Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, Haward University Press, 1982), pp.
23-6.
47 McIntyre and Beetz JJ. dissented in the result, writing that freedom of expression,
commercial or otherwise, "should not be suppressed except in cases where urgent and
compelling reasons exist and then only to the extent and for the time necessary for the
protection of the community". Irwin Toy (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at p. 637, [I9891 1
S.C.R. 927.
R. Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and the Charter" (1987), 37 U.T.L.J. 229.
49Thus again Canada will track the American experience. See J. Weinberg, "Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech" (1982) 82 Col. L. Rev. 720. As he puts it, "a
restriction on particular commercial speech will always be valid where the restriction
does not interfere with the transmittal of the information in question to the public."
Ibid., at p. 747.
46 S. Breyer,
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not pose a serious threat to existings0 information-based product
safety regulation can conveniently be divided into two categories.
The first, which I call "doctrinal", can be developed from the
language and rhetorical elements in Irwin Toy and Ford. The
second, which I call "practical", reflects the Realpolitik of product
safety regulation in Canada.
While I am not suggesting that reading past Supreme Court
judgments concerning the Charter will provide us with an answer
as to how the court will act in the future, such an exercise will help
us to recognize strands in certain judges' thinking that may come
together in the future.51 That there are ready-made formal
responses that can be employed to defend an attack on the constitutionality of information policies - especially mandatory
disclosure -is certainly of considerable import.
The first argument which one can make to defend most of the
current information-based product safety regulation is that state
action which requires information about product safety does not
"restrict" expression. As we have seen, the major policy strategy
employed by regulators in Canada requires mandatory disclosure
of certain information. This regulatory strategy permits the logical
argument to be made that requiring the disclosure of information
does not entail a "restriction" on expression. Mandatory
disclosure certainly diminishes corporations' absolute freedom
with regard to the entire informational package associated with a
particular consumer product, but it does not prevent corporations
from displaying whatever message, in whatever form they wish, so
long as it is not deemed to be deceptive or misleading.52
As I argue below, however, what is disturbing is that the courts may use the Charter to
regulate more intrusive regulatory intervention which employs information-based
policies to achieve product safety objectives.
51 That is, the exercise involves identifying ideas in which judges have faith, and assumes
that judges will, at least in the short run, act consistentlywithin their own belief system.
52 Of course, precisely the opposite argument can be made -that is, that forced speech is
even more demeaning to one's sense of identity and exercise of autonomy in the marketplace. My point is that the formal arguments can be structured, not that they are in any
sense at all determinative. And I realize, of course, that mandatory disclosure can be said
to restrict expression in so far as it is impossible to say simultaneously what the
government demands you say, and say what you would say without state intervention.
The decision one reaches on this kind of argument depends on whether one chooses to
conceive of the "package" of speech as a whole -which permits one to say that the state
has restricted expression; or whether one chooses to conceive of the "package" of speech
as consisting of two parts -which permits one to say that the state has not restricted
expression, but has simply required additional expressive conduct. Of course, it is impossible to say which conception is the right one.
50
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The likelihood that the court will view mandatory disclosure in
this fashion is reinforced by the language on the constitutional
values underlying the protection of commercial free speech in
both Ford and Irwin Toy. The objective of most informationbased regulation -that informed consumers are essential to the
fair and efficient functioning of a free market economys3 - is
almost identical to Dickson C.J.C.'s idea that the protection of
commercial speech is founded on the constitutional value of
permitting Canadians to make informed economic choices, and
thus through the market achieve autonomy and self-fulfillment.S4
Disclosure can be seen as facilitating the development of a
competitive market-place, rather than as "substituting regulation
for competition".ss
That is, mandatory disclosure helps to create those "autonomous and informed consumers" with whom the court is so
concerned in both Ford and Irwin Toy. The objective of
mandatory disclosure and the justification which the court uses in
Ford for limiting governmental control of information are
identical. If Irwin Toy manifests judicial concern with the
consumer's need for truthful information, then regulation
involving mandatory disclosure is consistent with the achievement
of the judicial goal.
Even if information regulation is said to violate s. 2(b) of the
Charter, there is a strong intuition that information-based product
safety regulation will be particularly easy to defend and thus be
"demonstrably justified" in accordance with s. 1 of the Charter.
The not so "stringent standard of justification" of the OakesS7 test
will likely permit the governments to defend successfully Charter
challenges.s8
53 See, for example, Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15U.S.C.

(1976), ss. 1451-61.
Ford v. Quebec (AtforneyGeneral) (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at p. 618, [I9881 2 S.C.R.
712.
.
55 Breyer, supra, footnote 46, at p. 161.
56 Moreover, mandatory disclosure of certain information on packages and labels is not,
most would agree, a sustantial infringement of producers' expressive rights. Perhaps
Wilson J.'s words that not every trivial or insubstantial effect on one's rights constitutes a
breach of the Charter, would be used by judges to justify upholding the legislation in
these circumstances. See R. v. Jones (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569, [I98612 S.C.R. 284.
57 This is the language used in R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, [I9861 1 S.C.R. 103
at pp. 138-40. Some argue that the test has been relaxed in R. v. Edward Books and A n
Ltd. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [I98612 S.C.R. 713, but the precise formulaic expression
is hardly determinative.
58 This is the approach, not surprisingly, which has been adopted in recent American
54
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The second aspect of the proportionality test articulated in
Oakes - presumably the most difficult to meet - requires that
the government demonstrate that it violates one's rights "as little
It is particularly well-framed to
as [is reasonably]
permit justification of information-based product safety
regulation policies. As we have seen, requiring certain information to accompany products introduced into the market is traditionally regarded as a relatively non-intrusive regulatory
instrument. Even the prohibition of certain information on a
package or label presumably infringes one's freedom to operate in
the market-place only marginally when compared to the alternatives - product design and performance standards and product
bans.
More important than the formal reasons for the view that the
status quo will not be affected by Ford and Irwin Toy, are the
practical political realities of consumer product safety regulation.
The picture drawn earlier of the operations of the federal Product
Safety Branch leads to a conclusion that most information-based
product safety regulatory initiatives are not presently in danger.
The fact that regulators and representatives from the regulated
enterprises co-operate to a large degree in policy formulation
means that the resulting legislation is often not particularly
damaging to large segments of the industry.60 Even a cursory
review of the information policies used in Canada now indicate
decisions which protect commercial speech, but build in a more relaxed standard of
judicial review. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U . S . 748 (1976),which rejected the distinction between commercial
and political speech, but which went on to hold that commercial speech would not be
protected in the same manner, nor to the same degree as other speech. See also, Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of New York, 447U.S. 557 (1980).
The case has been criticized for largely the same reasons as the Irwin Toy decision.
That is, expression deserves constitutional protection in so far as it is connected to
effective self-government, and individual self-fulfillment through free expression. As
Jackson and Jeffries argue, supra, footnote 8, at p. 6,the protection of commercial
speech serves "aggregate economic efficiency and consumer opportunity to maximize
utility in a free market -[but] these values are not appropriate for judicial vindication".
59 Oakes, supra, footnote 57,at p. 139 S.C.R. See also, Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 47,at
pp. 624-30.
60 This point is developed in the American context in C.E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets:
The World's Political-Economic System (New York, Basic Books, 1977). Michael
Pertschuk, a former Chair of the FederalTrade Commission has written that government
decision-making in the field of consumer protection has responded to the needs and
demands of business, and that there has been a failure of equity in government decisionmaking affecting business and consumer. See Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28 at pp.

114-15.
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that the full potential of mandatory disclosure to further the
interests of consumers as not been realized.61
Larger industries, which have a greater influence o n the
regulatory process, are simultaneously more capable of absorbing
compliance costs. These same companies are more likely to have
an interest as repeat players, as well as the resources, to challenge
regulatory action as compared to small businesses and importers
who confront considerably more risks in complex regulatory
schemes. Thus the incentive to challenge the provisions by those in
the best position to do so is lowered as the regulations serve in
some instances as effective barriers to entry into the industry.62
Furthermore, corporate actors in many industries welcome
government regulations to the extent that regulations restore the
confidence of the consumer in the safety of the product.63
To an outsider, mandatory disclosure of product safety risks and
prohibitions against disseminating information that is misleading
or deceptive are clearly not in the interests of any particular
industry participants. Nevertheless, the lack of serious
enforcement of many of the regulatory policies, the interests of the
most powerful in the industry in perpetuating the status quo, and
the risks of increased negative publicity in relation to product
safety, all combine to support a prediction that it is unlikely such
provisions will be challenged in court.
Finally the existence of detailed socio-economic justifications of
all new regulatory action in these areas since 1978 provides a
powerful justifkatory and legitimating weapon to the government.
Confronted with the apparent rigour of the analyses and evidence
of the delicate and rational balancing of costs and benefits that is
much of modern regulation, the courts will likely defer to
government in the case of most mandatory disclosure regulation.
Life-cycle costing is an area which has not yet been fully developed in Canadian
regulatory policy. See Belobaba, supra, footnote 5, at p. 38.
62 This point was made about fair packaging and labelling legislation in the United States in
the context of package size standardization. See Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28, at p. 147.
Similarlv. advertising bans have been said to create barriers to entry, and "so to solidify
or mag;& any mon&ly power wielded by existing successful" fi&.
See R.H.porter,
"The Impact of Government Policy on the U.S. Cigarette Industry" in Empirical
Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, P.M. Ippolito and D.T. Scheffman,
eds. (Washington, D.C., Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 1984), p.
659.
63 See P. Quirk, "The Food and Drug Administration" in J.O. Wilson, ed., The Politics of
Regulation (New York, Basic Books, 1980), p. 193.
61
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It Does Matter After All

I do not mean by all of this to be saying that the Ford and Zrwin
Toy decisions will have no significant influence on regulatory
policy in Canada. General restrictions on advertising, which I
have purposely set aside in this paper, will very likely suffer
serious constitutional defeats. That is, the language in Irwin Toy is
a clear signal that judges will be somewhat more aggressive in
assessing legislation that prohibits the disclosure of certain information, or that prohibits advertising in general, in contrast to their
response to regulation which requires the mandatory disclosure of
specified information. The latter, of course, furthers the professed
value which the court implies into the Charter - the creation of
autonomous and informed consumers. The former, as one
American jurist put it, involves covert state action to manipulate
individual choice by depriving the public of information required
to exercise their aut0nomy.6~
Second, if judges really demand that the regulatory agency
adopt the least restrictive regulatory alternative in order to pass
the impugned legislation under the Oakes test, there will
obviously always be less intrusive information-based regulatory
policies available to governments, including the provision of infor~ ~ the funding of
mation directly by the g o ~ e r n m e n t ,and
independent agencies to produce information whether on a forprofit or a not-for-profit basis. That is, legislation which prohibits
advertising generally, and perhaps more traditional mandatory
disclosure policies as well, will be said to come within the Charter
protection as defined in Irwin Toy,and may very well be struck
down as being too intrusive.
Third, anyone who reads the Supreme Court's language in Zrwin
Toy, in respect of "vulnerable groups" who are vulnerable to
, ~ ~ have serious doubts about the
seduction and m a n i p ~ l a t i o nmust
constitutional validity of information policies designed to
"protect" adults from making choices about their own welfare.
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
supra, footnote 58, at p. 575.
65 See, for example, the discussion of the information generation and dissemination activities of the American Consumer Product Safety Commission in F. Thompson and L.R.
Jones, Regulatory Policy and Practices (New York, Praeger, 1982) p. 68.
66The court, in applying the first branch of the Oakes test, is required to say that the
regulatory objective relates to concerns which are "pressing and substantial in a free and
democraticsociety". See Oakes, supra, footnote 57, at pp. 138-9S.C.R.
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There is certainly a strong sense that future courts will be asked to
limit Irwin Toy to the protection of children and similar vulnerable
gr0ups.6~Where the alleged regulatory beneficiaries are adults
and not children, the pressing and urgent reasons to justify
regulating speech conduct will be somewhat harder to come by.
While this will not of itself mean that the legislation will fail, it will
almost certainly justify a higher degree of scrunity in the latter
stages of review under s. 1.
A fourth concern is an increasing sense that claims that
mandatory disclosure policies are an effective regulatory
technique cannot always be defended. While the literature in this
area is somewhat rudimentary, there are several studies which
demonstrate that consumers ofien do not take advantage of the
information they are provided with in purchase transactions.68 The
difficulty with making greater use of information policies is that it
assumes that we can convey extremely complex and uncertain
technical data, showing some increased cost or risk, in an unambiguous yet accurate and useful manner across enormous numbers
of relatively insignificant consumer transactions. The fact that
many product safety risks are imposed on those who are not
parties to the original purchase (externalities or spillovers to
economists) suggests a stronger form of regulation may be
necessary. Even the most outspoken opponents of standard
setting and outright product bans recognize the need for them in
67 The language in Irwin

Toy is reminiscent of Blackmun J. who in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., supra, footnote 58, railed against
its "highly paternalistic approach" and counseled the opening of "the channels of
communication".
68 See D. Dewees, "The Quality of Consumer Durables: Energy Use" in D. Dewees, ed.,
The Regulation of Quality, supra, footnote 33, at p. 207. E. Belobaba, in Products
Liability and Personal Injury Compensation in Canada: Towards Integration and
Rationalization (Ottawa, Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1983), argues that many
consumers neither read nor care about the consumer product warranties, and that information disclosure requirements and truth in warranty legislation have not had much of an
impact on consumer decision-making.
That is not to say, of course, that information policies are ineffectiveper se. See R.A.
Posner, "The Federal Trade Commission's Mandated-Disclosure Program: A Critical
Analysis", in H. Goldschmid, ed., Business Disclosure: Government's Need to Know
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979). Posner finds that after the cigarette companies starting
disclosing tar and nicotine levels on their packages the market share of the cigarettes in
the lower categories climbed dramatically. See also Pertschuk, supra, footnote 28, at pp.
148-9,who describes the effectivenessof information disclosure in the case of automobile
gas mileage ratings, energy consumption of consumer durables and the tar and nicotine
levels of cigarettes.
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certain instances.69The question becomes not whether but when
and how.
Finally, one should not think that courts will necessarily agree
that "concrete, material facts found in advertising concerning
price, quality, and product safety [are] . . . matters which are . . .
ascertainable by the purveyor and also by the r e g ~ l a t o r " .The
~~
presentation of socio-economic impact analyses of proposed
regulatory activity will generate an image of a rationalist model of
regulation -but the reality of regulation is necessarily much less
coherent and much more complex than the model. The reality of
regulation may mean that governments will have only the most
rudimentary cost-benefit analyses, if they have any at all, to
defend violations of commercial expression under s. 1 of the
Charter.
I suspect that it is for this reason that the Quebec government
chose not to file numerous reports and studies used by it both in
enacting the advertising ban and subsequently in reviewing its
operation - an omission noted by the majority in Irwin Toy.71I
suspect that any regulatory agency would have to hesitate before
presenting a judge with a cost-benefit analysis of regulations under
the federal Transportation of Dangerous Goods
which
calculated the value of a human life saved as $500,000 corrected
from American dollar values and for inflation.73The problem
becomes transparent when one considers an assessment of
flammability standards under the federal Hazardous Products
Act, which took a range of values approaching $1,000,000 for the
expected 17 lives saved as a result of modified mattress
standards.74 The apparent objectivity and rationality of this
approach are further compromised by evidence that much of the
information required for the analysis is provided by industry
representatives75who by definition have an interest in minimizing
government intervention.
and Kagan write that "of course an information strategy is . .. inappropriate for
certain problems and certain objectives." See, supra, footnote 3, at p. 248.
70 See Sharpe, supra, footnote 48, at p. 236.
71 See Irwin Toy (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th)577at p. 618, [I9891 1 S.C.R. 927.
72 R.S.C. 1985,c. T-19.
73 See Transport Canada, Impact Assessment, Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations (Ottawa, Transport Canada, 1981), at VI-22.
74 See Socio Economic Impact Analysis of the Proposed Regulations Concerning Mattress
Flammability, Secor Inc. (Montreal, 1978), p. 36. The concern is not only with valuing
social benefits but in discounting the benefits enjoyed by future generations. See E.M.
Gramlich, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Programs (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
Prentice-Hall, 1981), Chapter 6, "Valuation of Resources Used or Benefits Created at
Different Times".
' 5 The SEIA produced in the aftermath of the 1.5L bottle ban contacted 55 sources, all but
69 Bardach
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Equally significant will be evidence, available in almost all
cases, that product safety regulation is motivated by a complex
array of institutional, economic, social and political considerations
which come together to move government^.^^ The realities of
regulation may shatter arguments that the decisions are in some
sense technical and thus beyond the institutional competence of
the courts to review in most cases.77The statement in Irwin Toy
that all the regulatory agency has to do is to have "had a
reasonable basis .. for concluding that the [regulatory action] . ..
impaired freedom of expression as little as possible given the
government's pressing and substantial 0bjective",7~is bizarre if it
means what it says - that all the regulatory agency has to do is
demonstrate that it had evidence to justify its own conclusion that
its actions were constitutional!

.

Conclusion
The consequences of treating commercial speech as a constitutional right go beyond my concerns that we will have restricted a
range of possible future choices by regulators to develop more
effective information regulation policies. Paradoxically, the
decision to give some protection to commercial expression may
justify more aggressive, and perhaps unjustifiable, use by
regulators of more intrusive performance and design standards
and product bans. Despite being more interventionist, so long as
the court has not yet "interpreted" economic liberties into the
Charter, product bans do not appear to be subject to constitutional review. On the other hand, the adoption of new more
intrusive and effective information policies may be discarded
despite the fact that Charter attacks on such legislation may in the
end be unsuccessful.
One would be foolish to take my conclusion - that most
seven of them connected the soft drink industry. See Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs, "Proposed Order and Regulations respecting glass containers of a
capacity of 1.5 litres or more containing a non-alcoholic carbonated beverage", Can.
Gaz. Part I, Vol. 114,No. 31, August 2,1980, p. 4574.
76 See "Ad ban motivated by politics, tobacco firm tells court", Globe and Mail, September
26, 1989, p. B 9. See also, D. Cohen, "The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the
UFFI Problem: Part I" (1983-84), 8 C.B.L.J. 309; Breyer, supra, footnote 46, at pp.
34-5.
77 It all depends of course on the attitudes which judges bring to demands that they "assess
competing social science evidence". See Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 71, at p. 626.
78 Ibid.
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existing information-based product safety regulation is not in
imminent danger of judicial nullification - as an excuse for
complacency. As we have seen, many of the reasons for this
conclusion are cause for concern: the absence of a demonstrated
political will to push reform further, the power of business
interests to influence the regulatory process, the uncritical use of
cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process, and the
lamentable enforcement record of many of the information-based
product safety regimes in Canada combine to suggest that the
impact of the Supreme Court's creation of constitutionally
protected corporate commercial speech will perpetuate a status
quo which has little to support it. Simultaneously, cases like Irwin
Toy and Jones place potential reforms focusing on rigorous generalized advertising p r ~ h i b i t i o n sat~ ~serious risk of constitutional
challenge. Like most of what we call law, the Charter will likely
operate openly to keep the world as it is; it will equally operate
insidiously against the making of a better world.

79 Other examples of

information-based regulation which may be at risk include strategies
like that adopted in s. 52(l)(b) of the federal Competition Act, which requires information disseminated by producers to be verified by adequate and proper tests. See
CompetitionAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, as amended.
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